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Immigration Judge:  Jack H. Weil  
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Noel Ricardo Stephens petitions for review of the Board of Immigration  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




Appeals’ (BIA) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (IJ) decision 
denying his applications for asylum, withholding, and relief under the Convention 
Against Torture (CAT), and ordering his removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
grant the petition and remand to the BIA for further proceedings. 
 Stephens is a native and citizen of Jamaica who entered the United States as a 
nonimmigrant in 1999.  His status was adjusted to legal permanent resident in May 2004.  
In 2011, he pleaded guilty to federal drug and weapons charges.  See W.D.N.Y. Crim. 
No. 6:11-cr-06037.  As a result, he was charged with removability for having been 
convicted of an aggravated felony, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), a controlled 
substance offense, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), two crimes involving moral turpitude 
(“CIMTs”), see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), and a firearms offense, see 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(C).  He appeared before an immigration judge (IJ) and conceded 
removability, and the charges were sustained.   
Stephens applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and for relief under the 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  After a hearing, the IJ issued a decision 
determining that Stephens was convicted of a “particularly serious crime” and, therefore, 
that he was only eligible for deferral of removal under the CAT.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1231(b)(3)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.31, 1208.16(d)(2).  Stephens’ CAT claim was 
predicated on his assertion that he would be subject to torture in Jamaica at the hands of 
the police or the community because of his status as a bisexual and as an informant for 
the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Agency.  The IJ denied Stephens 




proof on its own and that he had failed to provide reasonably available corroborating 
evidence.    
On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) concluded that Stephens had 
waived any challenge to the “particularly serious crimes” determination by failing to raise 
it in his brief.  The BIA then expressed its agreement with the IJ that Stephens did not 
establish eligibility for relief under the CAT.  The appeal was dismissed, and this petition 
for review ensued. 
We have jurisdiction to review final orders of the BIA pursuant to 8 U.S.C.           
§ 1252.  Because Stephens is removable by virtue of his conviction for an aggravated 
felony, our jurisdiction is generally limited to questions of law and constitutional claims, 
see id. § 1252(a)(2)(D), although we retain jurisdiction to review factual challenges to the 
CAT decision, see Nasrallah v. Barr, –– U.S. ––, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1688 (2020).  We 
review the agency's findings of fact under the substantial-evidence standard pursuant to 
which “findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be 
compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  Nasrallah v Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2020) 
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).   
Because Stephens appears pro se before the Court as an immigration petitioner, 
the need to construe his claims broadly is “accentuate[d].”  See Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 
F.3d 333, 340 (3d Cir. 2011).  So construed, the arguments in his brief challenge the 
Agency’s denial of CAT relief as unsupported by substantial evidence.   
To establish a CAT claim, Stephens had to show that he is “more likely than not” 




Jamaican public official.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); § 1208.18(a)(1); Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 
290 F.3d 166, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2002).  Stephens was required to establish his entitlement 
to relief by objective, not subjective, evidence.  Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 213 
(3d Cir. 2005). 
We first address the Agency’s treatment of Stephens’ CAT claim based on his 
sexual orientation.  Stephens testified that he is bisexual, and that he has had numerous 
boyfriends, including his current boyfriend, Leyton Ramsay, a transgender female.  
Subsequent to the hearing,1 Stephens provided a letter from Ramsay stating that she and 
Stephens had a “physical relationship” while in prison; they could not have a sexual 
relationship because BOP policies prohibited it.  A.R. at 13-14.  She maintained that the 
“entire compound knew we were together” and that “was upsetting to many other 
Jamaicans in the facility.”  Id. at 14.  According to Ramsey, these inmates threatened to 
beat up Stephens, and they threatened to kill her and Stephens “on spot” if they were ever 
seen in Jamaica.  Id.  She also indicated that two Jamaican inmates that Stephens knew 
told him that they called “family/mutual friends in New York and Jamaica to tell them 
that Noel was in prison having sex with another man.”  Id.  Ramsey stated that “everyone 
[in Jamaica] is talking about [Stephens] and the area leaders are saying he cannot come 
 
1 At the close of his immigration hearing, the IJ advised Stephens that his testimony was 
insufficient to support his claims absent corroborating evidence.  The IJ agreed to let the 
record remain open for 30 days to allow Stephens an opportunity to provide 






back to Jamaica because he was sleeping with a man in prison.”  Id. at 15.  As a result of 
this, Ramsey asserted that Stephens’ life would be in danger should he return to Jamaica. 
In addressing this claim on appeal, the Board appears to have assumed that 
Stephens had adequately established that he was a bisexual.2  It nevertheless found no 
error in the IJ’s decision that Stephens had failed to demonstrate that he more likely than 
not would be tortured because of his sexual orientation if removed to Jamaica, or that any 
such torture would be by or with the consent of the Jamaican government.  The Board 
emphasized the IJ’s reliance on country conditions evidence, particularly the 2018 State 
Department Human Rights Report, which indicated that while the LGBTQ community 
faces discrimination, threats, and harassment, its members are not subjected to torture or 
severe harm.  A.R. 207-08.  The Report also indicated that Jamaican law criminalizes 
consensual same-sex relations between men, but that the government enforced that 
portion of the law, “only in  cases of sexual assault and child molestation” and “[o]fficials 
did not prosecute consensual same-sex sexual conduct between men.”  Id.  But the IJ 
gave “little weight” to Ramsay’s letter, which detailed both specific death threats by 
Jamaicans against Stephens because of his bisexuality and Ramsey’s account of  
witnessing police turn a blind eye toward the abuse of LGBTQ individuals.  A.R. 13-16. 
The Board agreed with the IJ’s finding that the letter was inconsistent with Stephens’ 
 
2 The Board explicitly declined to rely on the IJ’s determination that Stephens’ testimony, 
by itself or in conjunction with Ramsey’s letter, was insufficient to meet his burden to 




testimony and the other evidence in the record.  However, this finding by the Agency is 
not supported by substantial evidence.   
The IJ found two inconsistencies between Ramsay’s letter and Stephens’ 
testimony.  A.R. at 93.  First, the IJ noted that while Stephens claimed that Ramsay was 
his current partner, in her letter Ramsay discussed their relationship while in prison and 
did not indicate that they were presently together.  A.R. at 13-14.  Although the status of 
their then-current relationship was not material to Stephens’ claim, the IJ could consider a 
discrepancy with the evidence in making credibility determinations and determining 
whether to discount it.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).  But the mere fact that Ramsay 
did not explicitly state that she was in a current relationship with Stephens does not make 
her letter necessarily inconsistent with his testimony that they were; she does not refer to 
Ramsay as her past partner or deny they are currently together.  In fact, Ramsay states 
that “I love Noel,” and she indicates that she speaks with Stephens “over three times 
every week” and is in touch with his family in Jamaica.  A.R. at 15.  Moreover, the point 
of her letter was to describe the death threats made against Stephens as the result of his 
relationship with Ramsay while they were imprisoned together.  Given this, the Agency 
erred in determining that Ramsay’s letter was inconsistent on this basis.    
Next, the IJ determined that Ramsey’s letter and Stephens’ testimony were 
inconsistent because Stephens did not testify to the assertions in Ramsay’s letter that he 
was threatened while in prison by Jamaican inmates who claimed that they would kill 
him if they saw him in Jamaica.  See A.R. at 93.  As the IJ noted, this information was 




record indicates that Ramsey’s letter is not inconsistent.  Stephens stated in his 
application for relief that he feared persecution in Jamaica because “I was beat up by the 
Jamaicans in the prison I was at and told I will be killed if we ever go back to Jamaica 
and most of those guys who was there know me very well and wear (sic) I used to live in 
Jamaica.”  A.R. at 273.  He further explained that information about his sexual 
orientation was not publicly known: “I was lock[ed] up when most of this start coming 
out because the transgender I was dateing (sic) had pictures of me and him together 
sleeping in [h]is phone that’s when everybody found out I really have a boyfriend.”  A.R. 
at 276.  During the hearing, the IJ’s questioning on this claim was strictly geared toward 
establishing whether Stephens was a bisexual; neither the IJ nor the Government asked 
Stephens about the threats he described in his application for relief, despite the fact that 
the threats were central to his claim.  Nevertheless, Stephens testified that “it all came out 
when a picture of me and another trans-gender was together and Jamaican guys got a 
hold of it, it was just a whole big situation.  It got back to Jamaica – man, it was just all 
down, downhill from right there. . . . Nobody knew, knew about it.  It came out when me 
and my boyfriend got into it and pictures started coming out. . . . This was 2000 – early 
2010.”  A.R. at 158, 160.  When Ramsey’s letter is viewed in conjunction with both 
Stephens’ testimony and the application for relief, it is not inconsistent on this point.   
Because neither of the IJ’s bases for determining that Ramsey’s letter was 
inconsistent with Stephens’ testimony is adequately supported by the record, the Agency 
erred in discounting it.  And because it is unclear how the Agency might have weighed 




claim, the error is not harmless.  See Yuan v. Att'y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 
2011) (applying harmless error on immigration review “when it is highly probable that 
the error did not affect the outcome of the case”).  We accordingly will remand to the 
Board so that it may reevaluate this CAT claim in light of this opinion. 
The BIA did not err in upholding the IJ’s denial of Stephens’ CAT claim based on 
his status as an ICE informant.  Stephens testified that he would likely be tortured by 
security forces in Jamaica as retribution for the information he provided as an ICE 
informant against their family or close friends.  For purposes of the appeal, the Board 
assumed that Stephens was an ICE informant.  A.R. at 4.  It nevertheless agreed with the 
IJ that Stephens had failed to demonstrate that he was more likely than not to be subject 
to torture in Jamaica because of his informant status.  The record does not compel a 
contrary finding.  In particular, the Agency properly concluded that the objective 
evidence in the record did not support Stephens’ claim that security forces targeted 
confidential informants.  See A.R. at 96; 194-95, 197-98.  And substantial evidence 
supports the conclusion that Stephens’ failed to “provide evidence of any ties between the 
persons he informed upon and the Jamaican security forces that he fears will target him 
because of his role as a confidential informant.”  A.R. at 4.  Stephens’ testimony on this 
claim was vague and did not convincingly establish that security forces in Jamaica would 
harm him; he failed provide any details including any of their names, their relationship 
with specific individuals on whom he had informed, or how they would know he was the 




hypothetical chain of events:  that “unnamed individuals”3 would know that Stephens had 
informed on them; those individuals would have to know he was back in Jamaica or be in 
the same place and recognize him or be able to locate him regardless of where he went in 
Jamaica; and those individuals would have to have a relationship with someone in the 
security forces intent on harming him.  Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that 
Stephens failed to show that each link in that hypothetical chain of events is more likely 
than not to occur.  See In re J-F-F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 918 & n.4 (A.G. 2006).  
Based on the foregoing, we will grant the petition for review, vacate the BIA’s 
order, and remand to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
3 The IJ found that Stephens failed to identify the Jamaican Nationals who were arrested 
and removed because of him.  This finding was clearly erroneous.  Stephens provided 
several names of individuals during the hearing, and, afterwards, he sent the IJ a list of 
additional names.  See A.R. at 146-47, 342.  Nevertheless, the Agency’s error was 
harmless. 
